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Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) ad-hoc network is
a significant contingency plan for communication after a natural
disaster, such as typhoon and earthquake. To achieve efficient
and rapid networks deployment, we employ noncooperative
game theory and amended binary log-linear algorithm (BLLA)
seeking for the Nash equilibrium which achieves the optimal
network performance. We not only take channel overlap and
power control into account but also consider coverage and
the complexity of interference. However, extensive UAV game
theoretical models show limitations in post-disaster scenarios
which require large-scale UAV network deployments. Besides, the
highly dynamic post-disaster scenarios cause strategies updating
constraint and strategy-deciding error on UAV ad-hoc networks.
To handle these problems, we employ aggregative game which
could capture and cover those characteristics. Moreover, we pro-
pose a novel synchronous payoff-based binary log-linear learning
algorithm (SPBLLA) to lessen information exchange and reduce
time consumption. Ultimately, the experiments indicate that,
under the same strategy-deciding error rate, SPBLLAs learning
rate is manifestly faster than that of the revised BLLA. Hence,
the new model and algorithm are more suitable and promising
for large-scale highly dynamic scenarios.
Index Terms—UAV, aggregative game, synchronous learning,
large-scale model, highly dynamic scenario
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
CATASTROPHIC natural and man-made disasters, suchas earthquakes, typhoons, and wars, usually involve
great loss of life and/or properties, historical interests in
vast areas. Though sometimes unavoidable, the loss of life
and property can be effectively reduced if proper disaster
management has been implemented. Since telecommunication
infrastructure can be vital for search and rescue missions after
disasters [1], when communication networks are damaged
by natural disasters, rapid deployment to provide wireless
coverage for ground users is quite essential for disaster man-
agement [2]. Considering that repairing communication infras-
tructures takes a long time, building vehicle relay networks
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was a preferable solution during the critical first 72 hours
[3]. In such relay networks, vehicles are distributed in the
post-disaster areas and act as communication infrastructures,
supporting mission-critical communication. However, vehicles
are likely barricaded by damaged roads, torrential rivers, and
precipices, etc, in the vast areas. Faced with those challenges,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) ad-hoc networks become a
good alternative for emergency response due to its numerous
advantages such as quick deployment and resilience in large-
scale harsh conditions [4][5].
To investigate UAV networks, novel network models should
jointly consider power control and altitude for practicability.
Energy consumption, SNR and coverage size are key points to
decide the performance of a UAV network [6]. Respectively,
power control determines the signal to energy consumption
and noise ratio (SNR) of UAV; altitude decides the number
of users that can be supported [7], and it also determines
the minimum value of SNR. It is because the higher altitude
a UAV is, the more users it can support, and the higher
SNR it requires. Therefore, power control and altitude are
two essential factors. There have been extensive researches
building models focusing on various network influence fac-
tors. For example, the work in [8] established a system
model with channels and time slots selections. Authors of [9]
constructed a coverage model which considered each agent’s
coverage size on a network graph. However, such models
usually consider only one specific characteristic of networks
but ignore systems’ multiplicity, which would bring great loss
in practice. Since UAVs will consume too much power to
improve SNR or to increase coverage size. Even though UAV
systems in 3D scenario with multi-factors of coverage and
charging strategies have been studied by [7], it overlooks
power control which means that UAVs might wast lots of
energy. To sum up, in terms of UAV ad-hoc networks in post-
disaster scenarios, power control and altitude which determine
energy consumption, SNR, and coverage size ought to be
considered to make the model credible [10].
In post-disaster scenarios, a great many of UAVs are re-
quired to support users [4]. Therefore, we propose aggregative
game theory into such scenarios and permit UAV to learn in
the constrained strategy sets. Because the aggregative game
can integrate the impact of all other UAVs on one UAV, it
reduces the complexity of receiving information and reduces
the data processing capacity of UAVs. For instance, in a
conventional game applied a scenario with N UAVs, it needs
to analyze N strategies which decide noise and coverage sizes
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
08
36
3v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  1
9 J
ul 
20
19
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATION, VOL. X, NO. X, AUGUST 2019 2
from each other individual UAV. However aggregative game
only needs to process the integrated noise and coverage sizes
of all other UAVs. Such an advantage is more obvious when
the number of UAVs is extremely large since figuring out each
others’ strategies is unrealistic [8]. In terms of constrained
strategy sets, due to environmental factors such as violent
winds [11] and tempestuous rainstorms, the action set of
UAVs has a restriction that cannot switch rapidly between
extreme high power or elevate altitude to low ones, but only
levels adjacent to them [12]. For instance, the power can
change from 1mW to 1.5mW in the first time slot and from
1.5mW to 2mW in the next one, but it cannot alter it directly
from 1mW to 2mW . Therefore, the aggregative game with
constrained sets is an ideal model for post-disaster scenarios.
A new algorithm which can learn from previous experiences
is required, and the algorithm with faster learning speed
is more desirable. Existing algorithms’ learning method is
learning by prediction. It means that UAV knows current
strategies with corresponding payoff and it can randomly
select another strategy and calculate its payoff. And then
UAV compares two payoffs. If the payoff of new strategy
is larger, the current strategy will be replaced by the new
strategy; if the current payoff strategy is large, it will remain
in the current strategy. However, under highly dynamic sce-
narios, complicate network conditions make UAVs hard to
calculate their expected payoffs but only learn from previous
experiences [11]. In this situation, UAV only can learn from
previous experience. UAV merely knows the current and the
last strategy with the corresponding payoff, and it can only
learn from these. In this case, if the two strategies are different,
UAV chooses the strategy with the larger payoff as the current
strategy in the next iteration; if the two strategies are the same,
a new strategy is randomly selected as the current strategy
of the next iteration. To sum up, the difference between the
existing and required algorithms is that the existing algorithm
calculates payoff for a new strategy (equivalent to prediction)
and chooses it based on prediction; while required algorithm
can be available when UAV only knows strategy’s payoff if
strategy has been selected, and then UAV can decide whether
to stick to the current strategy or return to the past strategy by
comparing their payoffs. Therefore, an algorithm which can
learn from previous experiences is required.
The learning rate of the extant algorithm is also not
desirable [13]. Recently, a new fast algorithm called binary
log-linear learning algorithm (BLLA) has been proposed by
[14]. However, in this algorithm, only one UAV is allowed to
change strategy in one iteration based on current game state,
and then another UAV changes strategy in the next iteration
based on the new game state. It means that UAVs are not
permitted to update strategies at the same time. Besides, to
determine which UAV to update strategy, the coordinating
process will occupy plenty of channel capacities and require
more time between two iterations [15]. If the algorithm can
learn synchronously, more than one UAV can update strategies
based on the current game state in one iteration. Thus, the
algorithm can be more efficient. To sum up, synchronous
update algorithms which can learn from previous experiences
are desirable, but only a little research investigated on it.
B. Contribution
We establish a multi-factor system model based on large-
scale UAV networks in highly dynamic post-disaster scenar-
ios. Considering the limitations in existing algorithms, we de-
vise a novel algorithm which is capable of updating strategies
simultaneously to fit the highly dynamic environments. The
main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We design a model which jointly considers multiple fac-
tors such as coverage and power control in multi-channel
scenario. The model with more network influence factors
ensures its reliability.
• We propose a novel UAV ad-hoc network model with the
aggregative game which is compatible with the large-
scale highly dynamic environments, in which several
influences are coupled together. In the aggregative game,
the interference from other UAVs can be regarded as the
integral influence, which makes the model more practical
and efficient.
• We revise BLLA and construct a novel payoff-based
binary log-linear learning algorithm (PBLLA). PBLLA
outperforms BLLA in the sense that it is capable of
learning previous utilities and strategies to fit for post-
disaster scenarios.
• We propose the synchronous payoff-based binary log-
linear learning algorithm (SPBLLA) which has the
following properties: 1) SPBLLA can learn with re-
stricted information; 2) In certain conditions, SPBLLA
approaches NE with constrained strategies sets; 3) SP-
BLLA allows UAVs to update strategies synchronously,
which significantly speeds up the learning rate; 4) SP-
BLLA avoids system disorder and ensures synchronous
learning, which is a main breakthrough.
We organize this paper as follows. In section II, we in-
troduce the related works. In section III, we first introduce
the UAV’s power control in the multi-channel communication
and coverage problems, then form a system model in highly
dynamic scenarios. Moreover, in section IV, we formulate
our work as an aggregative game and prove the existence
of the NE. In section V, we propose the two algorithms for
approaching the NE. Section VI presents the simulation results
and discussions. Ultimately, section VII gives a conclusion of
the whole study.
II. RELATED WORK
The literature mainly lies in four areas, we will present the
studies of UAV communication network, channel reuse in the
communication network, game theoretical approaches, and the
implementation algorithms sequentially.
A. UAV Communication Network
With the rapid commercialization of UAVs, a lot of research
has emerged in this field [16]. To efficiently deploy UAVs,
studies have been made to find out UAV distribution on net-
work graph [9] and a graphical model has been proposed for
channels reuse [17]. The resource allocation of channel and
time is also a hot area to study [8]. As mentioned previously,
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those models are impractical for post-disaster scenarios since
they fail to jointly consider power control and coverage which
are coupled factors.
B. Channel Reuse
Typical wireless protocol 802.11b/g only provides limited
channels for users, which is far more than enough for high-
quality communication services [18]. To reduce the load in
central system, making use of distributed available resources
in networks turns out to be an ideal solution. Underlay
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is considered as one
of the crucial technologies for cellular spectrum reuse for
user devices in communication networks [19]. The advantage
of D2D communication that allows end users to operate
on licensed channels through power control sheds light on
how interference management would work in UAV ad-hoc
networks [22].
C. Game Theoretical Approaches
Game theory provides an efficient tool for the cooper-
ation through resource allocation and sharing [20][21]. A
computation offloading game has been designed in order
to balance the UAV’s tradeoff between execution time and
energy consumption [25]. A sub-modular game is adopted
in the scheduling of beaconing periods for the purpose of
less energy consumption [23]. Sedjelmaci et al. applied the
Bayesian game-theoretic methodology in UAV’s intrusion
detection and attacker ejection [24]. However, most existing
models focus on common scenarios with less number of
UAVs, which are not compatible with large-scale scenarios
with large numbers of UAVs [26]. Aggregative game is a
characteristic game model which treats other agents’ strategies
as a whole influence, thus avoids overwhelming strategies
information from every single agent [27][28]. Inspired by this,
our model is built upon the aggregative game theory which
suits for large-scale scenarios.
D. Cooperative Algorithms
Compared with other algorithms, novel algorithm SPBLLA
has more advantages in learning rate. Various algorithms
have been employed in the UAV networks in search of the
optimal channel selection [31][29], such as stochastic learning
algorithm [30]. The most widely seen algorithm–LLA is an
ideal method for NE approaching [9][32]. The BLLA has
been employed by [33], which is modified from LLA to
update strategies in each iteration to converge to the NE.
However, only a single agent is allowed to alter strategies
in one iteration. In large-scale scenarios, more iterations are
required, which makes BLLA inefficient. It is obvious that
more UAVs altering strategies in one iteration would be more
efficient. To achieve it, the works in [34] and [35] have
provided a novel synchronous algorithm. However, there exist
superabundant restrictions that make the algorithm impractical
in most scenarios. Compared with the formers, SPBLLA
has fewer constraints and can achieve synchronous operation,
which can significantly improve the computational efficiency.
Post-disaster Area
UAV Ad-hoc Network
UAV
Covered User
Uncovered User
Network Link
User Linka The Topological Structure 
of Post-disaster Scenario b) Two Kinds of Communication 
Links Between Users
c) Altitude Influence on Coverage
Link2
Link1
UAV1
UAV2
UAV3
UAV4
User1 User2
Post-disaster Area
UAV
Post-disaster Area
UAV
h1
h2
Fig. 1: The topological structure of UAV ad-hoc networks.
a) The UAV ad-hoc network supports user communications.
b) The coverage of a UAV depends on its altitude and field
angle. c) There are two kinds of links between users, and the
link supported by UAV is better.
In summary, our work differs significantly from each of
the above-mentioned works, and other literatures in UAV ad-
hoc networks. As far as we know, our proposed algorithm is
capable of learning previous utilities and strategies, achieve
NE with restricted information and constrained strategies sets,
and update strategies synchronously, which significantly speed
up the learning rate.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We construct a UAV ad-hoc network in a post-disaster
scenario with M identical UAVs being randomly deployed,
in which M is a huge number compared with normal Multi-
UAV system. All the UAVs have the same volume of battery
E and communication capability. The topological structure of
Multi-UAV network is shown in Fig. 1 (a).
To support the communication mission, all UAVs are re-
quired to cooperate and support the user communication in
need. UAVs work above post-disaster area D. If a user (User1)
needs to communicate with another user (User2) far away
from him/her, the communication link can be set either di-
rectly between User2 (User1 → User2), or use UAVs above as
relay (User1 → UAV1 → UAV2 → · · · → UAVn → User2),
as shown in Fig. 1 (b). Since the users are far away from each
other, the link through UAVs provides better communication
quality than the direct one, users will choose Link2 if they
are covered by UAVs. Notice that users may not be covered
by UAVs due to the high uncertainty in post-disaster areas.
In the UAV ad-hoc network, there are N channels avail-
able for UAVs to communicate, which are labeled as C =
[C1, ..., Cn, ..., CN ]. Each channel holds at most Cmax UAVs
due to interference constraint. Following the water-filling
allocation scheme [36], UAVs select one channel Cn in the
beginning of the process and will not change their decision
afterwards. Assuming that UAVi’s decision is represented
by the vector Ci = [Ci1, ..., Cin, ...CiN ], where Cin = 1
if UAVi selects channel Cn, otherwise Cin = 0. Since
the channel of each UAV is fixed, UAVs cannot switch to
other channel with less noise to improve SNR, but only
capable of raising SNR by coordinating their own power. The
power for UAVi in each channel is denoted by the vector
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Pi = [Pi1, ..., Pin, ..., PiN ], Pin > 0 when UAVi selects the
channel Cn, otherwise, Pin = 0. The intrinsic noise in each
channel is Noise = [Ns1, ..., Nsn, ..., NsN ].
UAVs have several power levels and altitude levels. In
the midst of extreme environments, UAVs cannot change
its voltage dramatically but merely change to the adjacent
power level [12]. Similarly, the altitude changing also has
a limitation that only adjacent altitude level conversion is
permitted in each move. We denote power set and altitude set
to be P = {P1, ..., Pk, ..., Pnp} and h = {h1, ..., hk, ..., hnh},
respectively, where np is the number of power levels, and
nh is the number of altitude levels. We assume that the gap
between different levels of power and altitude are equal. Let
∆P and ∆h denote the distance value of adjacent power levels
and altitude levels, respectively.
When UAVs need communications, and the signal to noise
rate (SNR) mainly determines the quality of service. UAVs’
power and inherent noise are interferences for each other.
Since there are hundreds of UAVs in the system, each UAV
is unable to sense all the other UAVs’ power explicitly, but
only sense and measure aggregative interference and treat
it as an integral influence. Though increasing power can
improve SNR, excessively large power causes more energy
consumption and results in less running time. Therefore,
proper power control for UAVs is needed to be carefully
designed.
Coverage is another factor which determines the perfor-
mance of each UAV. As presented in Fig. 1 (c), the altitude of
UAV plays an important role in coverage adjusting. The higher
altitude it is, the larger coverage size a UAV has. A large
coverage size means a substantial opportunity of supporting
more users, but a higher SNR will be needed. Furthermore,
the turbulence of upper air disrupts the stability of UAVs with
more energy consumption. Thus, a suitable height is essential
to determine the coverage area.
B. Problem Formulation
Defining a UAV ad-hoc network game Γ = (Ui, Si)i∈M ,
where Ui is the utility function of UAVi and Si is the strategy
set of UAVi. Take si ∈ Si as one strategy of UAVi, then
si = [Ci, Pi, hi]. For simplicity, we denote S−i ∈
∏
j 6=i Sj
as the strategy set of UAVs except UAVi and s−i ∈ S−i.
S =
∏
i Si, and s ∈ S is the strategy profile of the game.
As is described previously, UAVs can only sense the
aggregative influence in each channel they select. Defining
such influence as a power interaction term, which of UAVi
is written as:
σip(s−i) = (σ − Pi)⊗ Ci, (1)
where σ =
∑
i∈M Pi + Noise and ⊗ is the operator that
multiplies corresponding elements in two vectors. For the
convenience of notation, denoting the nth element in σip(s−i)
to be σip(s−i)(n), which is the power interaction in Cn. It
should be noticed that, when UAVi does not choose Cn,
σip(s−i)(n) = 0.
Supposing that a UAV covers a round area below it with
a field angle θ as shown in Fig. 1 (b). Thus the coverage of
UAVi is Di = pi(hitanθ)2. Considering that the higher the
UAV2
Post-disaster area
UAV1
User
User
User
User
User
User
User
User
Supported by 
UAV1
Supported by 
UAV2
User User User
Fig. 2: Coverage overlap between two UAVs. When two UAVs
are close, there will be overlap areas among them and the
utility of coverage will decrease.
altitude is, the severer the air turbulence a UAV suffers, the
utility of a coverage area is
D˜i = pi(hitanθ)
2·β , (2)
where β is the air turbulence index, which decreases as the
altitude increases.
When there are numbers of UAVs in the network, it is
possible for the coverage areas of different UAVs to overlap.
When a UAV overlaps with another, they will not support
all users but share the mission. The users in the overlaps
will be served randomly with equal probability by each UAV.
Fig. 2 presents the overlaps between two UAVs, i.e. UAV1
and UAV2 will support half of the users in the overlap area.
In this condition, the true coverage D¯i is smaller than Di, and
it is written as
D¯i = Di − κ
∑
j 6=i
Dj , (3)
where κ is the index which decides the influence of overlap.
Since D¯i must satisfy that D¯i > 0, κ is a tinny index. In a
large-scale network, Di <<
∑
j 6=iDj and κ << 1.
In order to support as many users as possible, UAVs are
required to enlarge coverage size, which is equal to enlarge
the coverage proportion in the mission area. Higher altitude
indicates larger coverage size as shown in Fig. 1 (c). The
utility of coverage size is denoted as
UD =
D˜i
D
. (4)
Now we define the utility functions of energy, SNR and
coverage to calculate UAVs’ payoffs.
For power selection of UAVi, a large power does not
necessarily result in high utility due to the large interference
comes with it. Taking energy saving and longer lifetime
into consideration, choosing the right amount of power that
balances the tradeoffs between power and interference, brings
the highest utility. We define the energy utility function UE
as:
UE =
E∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
. (5)
It should be noted that a high power provides UAVs with
higher communication quality and larger coverage requires
higher power.
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As for power control, the SNR in channel Cn for UAVi is
SNR =
Pin∑
j 6=i Pjn +Nsn
. (6)
And it can also be written as µCin[Pin − γσip(s−i)(n)] [8],
where γ is the SNR balance index and µ is the SNR index.
If given the Shannon capacity
C = Blog2(1 + SNR), (7)
which decides the communication quality to be improved,
SNR is supposed to be enlarged. The summation SNR of
UAVi is µ
∑
i∈M [Pi − γσip(s−i)] ⊗ Ci, where we broaden
the meaning of
∑
and the formula is the summation of all
elements in the vector.
According to the previous definitions, we use an equation
and an index to balance the tradeoff between power control
and coverage, and we formulate the SNR utility function as:
USNR = µ
∑
i∈M
[Pi − γσip(s−i)]⊗ Ci − αD¯i, (8)
where α is the index that balances the tradeoff between SNR
and coverage size.
Finally, in terms of the utility function Ui of UAVi, we
should find a balance among power limitation, SNR and
coverage size. Then the utility function Ui of UAVi is defined
as:
Ui(si, σip(s−i)) = AUE +BUSNR + CUD
=
AE∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
+B{µ
∑
[Pi − γσip(s−i)]⊗ Ci − αD¯i}+ CD˜i
D
,
(9)
where A, B and C are balance indices that balance three
utilities on the basis of post-disaster scenario. The ultimate
goal for enlarging the utility of the networks is to enlarge the
summation of utility function (9) of each UAV, and we define
the global utility function as the goal function:
U =
∑
i∈M
Ui(si, σip(s−i)), (10)
which presents the performance of the UAV ad-hoc network.
IV. MULTI-AGGREGATOR AGGREGATIVE GAME
A. Multi-aggregator Aggregative Game Model
We formulate the UAV ad-hoc network game in large-scale
post-disaster area as a multi-aggregator aggregative game [27],
where we calibrate its definition in our UAV network model
and put it as follows.
Definition 1: (Multi-aggregator Aggregative Game) The
game Γ = (Ui, Si)i∈M is called a multi-aggregator aggrega-
tive game with two or more aggregators g = g1, g2, ..., gK ,
gk : S → Rn (n is the dimension of aggregators), and S
is bounded, if there exists two or more interaction functions
σi = {σi1, σi2, ..., σiK}, and σik : S−i → X−i ⊆ Rn, i ∈ M
such that each of the payoff functions i ∈ M can be written
as:
Ui(s) = ui(si, σi1(s−i), σi2(s−i), ..., σiK(s−i)), (11)
where ui : Si × X−i × X−i × ... × X−i → R, and for any
fixed strategies profile s:
gk(s) = g(σik(si, s−i)). (12)
In the UAV ad-hoc network game, σi1(s−i) is the power
interaction term σip(s−i), which is the aggregative power
influence from other UAVs for UAVi. Another interaction
term σi2(s−i) is named as area interaction term σia(s−i):
σi2(s−i) = σia(s−i) =
∑
j 6=i
Dj . (13)
Besides, the aggregators g1(s) and g2(s) of the UAV ad-hoc
network game are as follows:
g1(s)(n) = (σip(s−i) + Pi)(n), (14)
where g1(s)(n) is the nth element of g1(s). g1(s)(n) is the
summation of power and noise in channel n, which has
been chosen by UAVi. If the strategy profile s is fixed, the
summation of power and noise in all channels are fixed.
Therefore, for any value of i, g1(s)(n) is the same, if the
stratefy profile s is fixed.
g2(s) = σia(s−i) +Di. (15)
σia(s−i) is the area covered by UAVs except of UAVi.
Therefore g1(s) is the summation of all UAV’s coverage area.
For any value of i, g2(s) is the same, if the stratefy profile s
is fixed.
The utility function Ui(Si, σip(S−i)) in UAV ad-hoc net-
work game conforms to the definition of payoff function
Ui(S). Therefore, UAV ad-hoc network game is a multi-
aggregator aggregative game.
B. Analysis of Nash Equilibrium
In game theory, Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a special state
that no UAV can gain more payoff by changing its strategy.
Thus, NE is an ideal solution for all UAVs in multi-UAV
relay mission game [8]. The potential game is usually used
in analyzing the existence of NE. We first define the Pure
Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) with several assumptions,
then prove that the UAV ad-hoc network game has a NE.
Definition 2: (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium) A strategy
profile s∗ = {s∗1, s∗2, ..., s∗m} is a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium if and only if any UAV is unable to gain more payoff
by altering their strategies when no other UAVs change their
strategies, i.e.,
Ui(si, s
∗
−i) ≤ Ui(s∗i , s∗−i), i ∈M, si 6= s∗i . (16)
Definition 3: (Potential Game) A game Γ = (φi, Si)i∈M
such that Si is the strategy of UAVi, si ∈ Si. We broaden
the meaning of
∏
and write the set of all strategies as
S =
∏
Si. Labeling the set of UAVs except UAVi as
S−i =
∏
j 6=i Sj ,s−i ∈ S−i. There exists a potential function
φi(s−i) : S−i → Si. If there exists a function P : S → R for
∀i ∈M such that
Ui(s
′
i, s−i)− Ui(si, s−i) = φ(s′i, s−i)− φ(si, s−i), (17)
then this game is a potential game.
Definition 3 indicates that the change of utility function is
the same amount of the change of potential function, which
gives an ideal property to the potential game.
Theorem 1: Any potential game with finite strategy has at
least one PSNE.
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Proof: Please refer to the proof of Corollary 2.2 in [37].
Theorem 2: The UAV ad-hoc network game is a potential
game and has at least one PSNE.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Since the UAV ad-hoc network game is a special type of
potential game, we can apply the properties of the potential
game in the later analysis. Some algorithms that have been
applied in the potential game can also be employed in the UAV
ad-hoc network game. In the next section, we investigate the
existing algorithm with its learning rate in large-scale post-
disaster scenarios and propose a new algorithm which is more
suitable for the UAV ad-hoc network in such scenarios.
V. LEARNING ALGORITHM
A. Payoff-based Binary Log-Linear Learning
In the literatures, most works search PSNE by using the
Binary Log-linear Learning Algorithm (BLLA). However,
there are limitations of this algorithm. In BLLA, each UAV
can calculate and predict its utility for any si ∈ Si in
the complete strategy set. While in UAV ad-hoc networks,
UAVs are accessible only to the constrained strategy set
and corresponding utilities in the last two decision periods.
Thus, conventional BLLA is no more suitable for the scenario
we considered here, we propose a revised algorithm based
on BLLA, called Payoff-based Binary Log-linear Learning
Algorithm (PBLLA) to resolve the issue.
In this section, we will present how PBLLA works and the
convergence of PBLLA.
Theorem 3: Let denote τ as the dynamic degree of the
scenarios. The harsher environment the networks suffers, the
higher τ it is. In the highly dynamic scenarios, we suppose that
τ ≥ 0.01. With proper τ , PBLLA asymptotically converges
and leads the UAV ad-hoc network game approaching to the
PSNE.
Proof: The proof of the convergence of PBLLA is similar
to that of BLLA in [38]. According to [38], we only need
to illustrate that UAV ad-hoc network game conforms to the
following two assumptions.
Assumption 1: For ∀i ∈ M and all strategy profile pairs
s0i , s
n
i ∈ A, there exists a series of strategies s0i → s1i → ...→
sni satisfying that s
k
i ∈ Ci(sk−1i ) for ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, where
Ci(s
k
i ) is the constrained strategies set of strategy profile s
k
i .
Assumption 2: For ∀i ∈ M and all strategy profile pairs
s01, s
n
2 ∈ A,
s2i ∈ Ci(s1i )⇔ s1i ∈ Ci(s2i ). (18)
In the UAV ad-hoc network game, UAVs are only permitted
to select the adjacent power and altitude levels. It is evident
that for any strategy profile pair s0i , s
n
i ∈ A, s0i can change
power and altitude step by step to reach sni , vice versa.
Thus, UAV ad-hoc network game satisfies Assumption 1 and
Assumption 2. The remaining proof can follow Theorem 5.1
in [38].
The essence of PBLLA is selecting an alternative UAV
randomly in one iteration and improving its utility by al-
tering power and altitude with a certain probability, which
Algorithm 1 Payoff-based Binary Log-linear Learning Algo-
rithm
1: Initialization: Selecting an arbitrary power and altitude
profile s ∈ S and arbitrary channels for each UAV, the
number of UAVs in a channel must be less than Cmax.
2: Set t = 1.
3: Set s(t) = s, xi(t) = 0 for any UAVi such that i ∈M .
4: Set dynamic degree index τ ∈ (0,∞).
5: Repeat
6: if xi(t) = 0 for ∀i ∈M then
7: Select UAVi randomly.
8: Select si(t + 1) randomly in Ci(si(t)), which is the
constrained strategies set when the current strategy is
si(t).
9: xi(i+ 1) = 1.
10: else
11: Select UAVi which satisfies xi(i+ 1) = 1,
12: With probability exp[
1
τ Ui(s(t−1))]
exp[ 1τ Ui(s(t−1))]+exp[ 1τ Ui(s(t))]
,
13: si(t+ 1) = si(t− 1);
14: Or with probability exp[
1
τ Ui(s(t))]
exp[ 1τ Ui(s(t−1))]+exp[ 1τ Ui(s(t))]
,
15: si(t+ 1) = si(t).
16: xi(t+ 1) = 0.
17: end if
18: for UAVj , j ∈M and j 6= i do
19: sj(t+ 1) = sj(t) and xj(t+ 1) = 0
20: end for
21: t = t+ 1
22: End Repeat
is determined by the utilities of two strategies and τ . UAV
prefers to select the power and altitude which provide higher
utility. Nevertheless, highly dynamic scenarios will cause
UAVs to make mistakes and pick the worse strategy. The
dynamic degree index τ determines the dynamic degree of
the situation and UAV’s performance. Small τ means less
dynamic scenarios and fewer mistakes when UAVs are making
decisions. When τ → 0 which equals to stabilization, UAV
will always select the power and altitude with higher utility;
when τ → ∞ where exists sever dynamics, UAV will
choose them randomly. However, PBLLA has its limitations
that PBLLA is only one single UAV is allowed for altering
strategies in one iteration. We will propose a new algorithm
in the next section to overcome the restrictions.
B. Synchronous Payoff-based Binary Log-linear Learning
Since PBLLA only allows one single UAV to alter strategies
in one iteration, such defect would cause computation time
to grow exponentially in large-scale UAVs systems. In terms
of large-scale UAVs ad-hoc networks with a number of
UAVs denoted as M , M2 times of exchange messages will
be needed to coordinate and guarantee that only one UAV
changes strategy in each iteration. Such a process not only
consumes large energy but also prolongs convergence time.
Algorithms that can improve the learning rate and reduce
messages exchange is urgently needed. Thus, we propose
the Synchronous Payoff-based Binary Log-linear Learning
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Algorithm (SPBLLA), which permits each UAV altering their
strategies synchronously and learning with no message ex-
change.
Algorithm 2 Synchronous Payoff-based Binary Log-linear
Learning Algorithm
1: Initialization: Selecting an arbitrary power and altitude
profile s ∈ S and arbitrary channels for each UAV, the
number of UAVs in a channel must be less than Cmax.
2: Set t = 1s(1) = s
3: Set xi(t) = 0 for any UAVi such that i ∈M .
4: Set dynamic degree index τ ∈ (0,∞).
5: Set probability index m, and the altering strategies prob-
ability ω = (e−
1
τ )m.
6: Repeat
7: for ∀UAVi do
8: if xi(t) = 0 then
9: With probability ω:
10: UAVi select si(t + 1) randomly in Ci(si(t)),
which is the constrained strategy set when the current
strategy is si(t),
11: xi(i+ 1) = 1;
12: or With probability (1− ω):
13: si(t+ 1) = si(t),
14: xi(i+ 1) = 0.
15: else
16: With probability exp[
1
τ Ui(s(t−1))]
exp[ 1τ Ui(s(t−1))]+exp[ 1τ Ui(s(t))]
,
17: si(t+ 1) = si(t− 1);
18: Or with probability exp[
1
τ Ui(s(t))]
exp[ 1τ Ui(s(t−1))]+exp[ 1τ Ui(s(t))]
,
19: si(t+ 1) = si(t).
20: xi(t+ 1) = 0.
21: end if
22: end for
23: t = t+ 1.
24: End Repeat
The process of SPBLLA let UAVs free from message
exchange. Therefore, there is no waste of energy or time con-
sumption between two iterations, which significantly improves
learning efficiency. All UAVs are altering strategies with a
certain probability of ω, which is determined by τ and m. τ
also presents the dynamic degree of scenarios. The chance of
UAVs to make mistakes when altering strategies is determined
by the dynamic degree as in PBLLA.
To prove the convergence of SPBLLA, we first provide
some conceptions.
Definition 4: (Regular Perturbed Markov Process) Denote
P as the transaction matrix of a Markov Process which
has a finite state space S. This Markov Process is called
regular perturbed markov process with noise  if the following
conditions are met.
1) P is aperiodic and irreducible when  > 0.
2) lim→0 P = P0, where P0 is an unperturbed process.
3) For any sn, sm ∈ S, when P(sn, sm) > 0, there exists a
function R(sn → sm) ≥ 0, which is called the resistance of
Fig. 3: Two trees rooted at s3
changing strategy from sn to sm, such that
0 < lim
→0+
P(s
n, sm)
R(sn→sm)
<∞. (19)
Definition 5: (Stochastically Stable Strategy) Denote P
as the transaction probability of a regular perturbed Markov
process in a state space S, and µ(s) is the probability that
the state transforms to s. The state is a stochastically stable
strategy if
lim
→0+
µ(s) > 0. (20)
In our model, when UAVs of repeated UAV ad-hoc net-
work game adheres to regular perturbed Markov process, the
probability of being in s is
µ(s) =
−φ(s)∑
s˜∈S −φ(s˜)
. (21)
Let L denote a series of adjacent strategies, then L =
{s0 → s1 → ... → an}. In any adjacent strategies pairs
(sk−1, sk), the resistance of changing strategy from sk−1 to
sk is R(sk−1, sk). The resistance of path L is the sum of each
move
R(L) =
m∑
k=1
R(sk−1 → sk). (22)
According to L, we give the definition of resistance tree.
Definition 6: (Resistance Tree) In a strategy profile space S,
strategy profiles are linked. A tree T , rooted at strategy profile
s, is a set of directed edges that any other strategy profile
has only one directed path, which consists of several directed
edges, leads to s. The resistance of T is the summation of
resistance of all directed edges,
R(T ) =
∑
s′→s′′∈T
R(s
′ → s′′). (23)
Denoting T (s) as all the trees that rooted at strategy profile
s, then the stochastic potential of strategy profile s can be
written as
γ(s) = min
T∈T (s)
R(T ). (24)
The minimum resistance tree of strategy space S is the tree
that has the minimum stochastic potential,
R(Tmin) = min
s∈S
γ(s). (25)
For example, Fig. 3 shows different tree rooted at S3. The
branches are linked in different ways.
With these definitions, we can prove the convergence of
SPBLLA.
Theorem 4: Considering several UAVs with UAV ad-hoc
network game with potential function φ : S → R. When
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all UAVs adhere to SPBLLA, if m is large enough, the
stochastically stable strategies are maximizers of the potential
function, which are PSNEs.
Proof: Refer to Appendix B.
Remark 1: According to Appendix B, to make the SPBLLA
converge, m should be twice larger than the most massive
altering amount of each UAV’s utility function.
Theorem 5: m is an index that indirectly influences the
learning rate. If m satisfies
m > 2∆, (26)
where
∆ =AE
∆P∑
Ci · P1 · (P1 + ∆P ) +B
∑
Ci ·∆P
+Bγ∆P ·
∑
(
∑
j 6=i
Cj ⊗ Ci)
+Bαpitan2θ(2hnh∆h−∆h2)
+Bακ(M − 1)pitan2θ(2hnh∆h−∆h2)
+
C
D
pitan2θ[h2βnh − (hnh −∆h)2β ],
then SPBLLA converge.
Proof: Refer to Appendix C.
Remark 2: Let each UAV alter strategy as large as possible
to make utility function change significantly. Calculating the
most significant difference that a utility function can make in
an iteration, and we are capable of learning the range of m.
VI. SIMULATION RESULT AND DISCUSSION
In this section, how the key parameters in the UAV ad-
hoc network affect the performance of PBLLA and SP-
BLLA will be studied. In the simulation, besides the quan-
tity of UAVs and channel, other parameters are fixed as
constant values. We set up the post-disaster area as D =
4000km2. M = 100 UAVs are scatted in the area. There are
N = 30 channels and each channel can hold Cmax = 25
UAVs at most, and each UAV selects NC = 5 chan-
nels set np = 40 levels of power are accessible P =
{0.025W, 0.05W, 0.75W, ..., 0.975W, 1W}, and the gap be-
tween two levels is ∆P = 0.025W . Noise is randomly
distributed from 0.025W to 1W . nh = 46 levels of altitude
are accessible h = {1km, 1.2km, 1.4km, ..., 9.8km, 10km},
and the distinction between two levels is ∆h = 0.2km. The
battery capacity of UAV for communication is E = 5mAh.
Field angle which determines the coverage size is θ = 30o.
The balance indices vary from one to another in the diverse
scenarios. Here we choose A = 0.002, B = 0.005, C = 0.03,
and α = 0.002, γ = 0.002, κ = 10−4, µ = 10. β decreases
as h increases. According to Theorem 5 in the last section,
when m > 2∆, SPBLLA is feasible.
A. Effect of Scenarios’ Dynamic Degree τ
In this part, we investigate the influence of environment
dynamic on the network states. With different scenarios’
dynamic degree τ ∈ (0,∞), PBLLA and SPBLLA will
converge to the maximizer of goal function with different
altering strategy probability. Fig. 4 presents the influence of
the dynamics on PBLLA. We can find out that the fluctuation
during converging is severe in both algorithms, which is
different from other related works. It does not result from the
bad performance of algorithms but from the highly dynamic
scenarios. When the environment is highly dynamic with
high values of τ , which brings about more mistakes when
selecting powers and altitudes. Thus, when UAVs have low
probabilities to select the right strategy, it will result in non-
optimal decisions. In the rest simulations, similar phenomena
can also be observed.
As the dynamic degree index τ decreases from 0.03 to 0.01,
the goal function’s values are increasing, which illustrates that
lower values of τ approach to maximizer of the global utility
function. When τ = 0.03, the value of U does not increase
much before converge. The fact that the severe interference
from the environment seriously influences the UAV network
making UAVs, making mistakes when altering strategies, can
account for such a result. In Fig. 5, ∆U is the value that
presents the difference between the value of each iteration and
the average function value after convergence. Compare two
lines of τ = 0.01 and τ = 0.03 in Fig. 5. The fluctuation of
τ = 0.03 is around 50% more than that of τ = 0.01, showing
that the rough environments lead to unstable converge states.
Fig. 7 and 8 show the performance of SPBLLA, which is
similar to that of PBLLA. In the simulation of the SPBLLA,
m = 0.03, which follows the instruction of Theorem 5. Those
mentioned figures show that when τs in PBLLA and SPBLLA
are equal, the final optimum states and maximizer are similar.
B. Performance on SNR and Coverage
Since PBLLA is similar to SPBLLA, we skip the perfor-
mance analysis for PBLLA, but focus on SPBLLA only. We
set m = 0.03 and τ from 0.01 to 0.03. Fig. 6 and Fig. 9
present the performance average SNR and the coverage size
of the whole UAV ad-hoc network. The interference from the
environment causes fluctuation. When the scenario dynamic
degree is getting lower, the network is capable of approaching
to a better outcome, and the SNR and coverage size is
getting larger. In the slower dynamic scenario (τ = 0.01),
the UAV ad-hoc networks can cover 95% post-disaster area.
Even though the interference from the environment is serious
(τ = 0.03), the coverage proportion can be up to 80%.
C. Altering strategies probability m on SPBLLA
The opportunities for UAVs changing strategies in each
SPBLLA’s iteration are determined by the probability index
m. The altering probability ω = (e−
1
τ )m illustrates that
higher m provide less probability for UAVs altering strategies.
Higher probability enables higher chances for more UAVs
altering strategies at the same time. Thus lower m ensures
high frequencies of changing strategies and faster converge
rates. According to the limitation of m in equ. (26), we figure
out that m > 0.028.
Fig. 10 shows the effect of m on the behavior of SPBLLA.
Setting τ = 0.01 and m > 0.028, we choose 5 values from
0.03 to 0.05. As m getting higher, SPBLLA needs more time
for convergence. Since higher m results in less opportunity for
UAVs to alter strategies, fewer UAVs change strategies at the
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same time. For the sake of getting to the same optimum state,
higher m requires a longer time for convergence. It is also
presented in Fig. 10 that m does not influence the optimum
state. The same value of τ and various values of m converge
to the state that shares the similar value of the global utility
function, and a higher probability for altering strategies save
UAV ad-hoc networks convergence time.
D. Power Control
Allocating appropriate power is one of the key factors
that affect UAV’s utility, and the proper value of power will
significantly improve the quality of service.
Fig. 11 presents the sketch diagram of a UAV’s utility with
power altering. The altitudes of UAVs are fixed. When other
UAVs’ power profiles are altering, the interference increases
and the curve moves down. The high interference will reduce
the utility of the UAV. Fig. 11 also shows that utility decreases
and increases with power improving. Small and large power
both provide high utilities, which is because small power will
save energy and large power will increase SNR. The UAV
might select the largest power to increase utility. However,
The more power one UAV uses, the more interference other
UAVs will receive and other UAVs’ utilities will reduce. For
the sake of enlarging the global utility, the largest power is
not the optimal strategies for the whole UAV ad-hoc network.
The best power will locate in some values that smaller than
the largest power (The optimal value in the figure is a sketch
value).
E. The number N of UAVs
In the large-scale UAV ad-hoc networks, the number of
UAVs is another feature that should be investigated. Since the
demanding channel’s capacity should not be more than the
channel’s size we provide, we limit the number of UAVs in
the tolerance range which satisfies that each UAV’s channel
selection is contented. In this scenario, there are N = 50
channels, and the number of UAVs should be limited to M ≤
250.
Fig. 12 shows how the number of UAVs affect the computa-
tion complexity of SPBLLA. Since the total number of UAVs
is diverse, the goal functions are different. The goal functions’
value in the optimum states increase with the growth in UAVs’
number. Since goal functions are the summation function
of utility functions, more UAVs offer more utilities which
result in higher potential function value. Moreover, more
UAVs can cover more area and support more users, which
also corresponds with more utilities. Fig. 12 also shows how
many iterations that UAV ad-hoc network needs to approach
to convergence. With the number of UAVs improves, more
iterations are required in this network.
F. Comparison of PBLLA and SPBLLA
In this subsection, we do a comparison between PBLLA
and SPBLLA to investigate the superiority of SPBLLA. We
fix τ at several different values then compare the convergence
rates of PBLLA and SPBLLA.
Fig. 13 presents the learning rate of PBLLA and SPBLLA
when τ = 0.01. As m increases the learning rate of SP-
BLLA decreases, which has been shown in Fig. 13. However,
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when m is small, SPBLLA’s learning rate is about 3 times
that of PBLLA showing the great advantage of synchronous
learning. When τ = 0.015 and τ = 0.02 as shown in
Fig. 14, such phenomenon also exists. Since PBLLA merely
permits a single UAV to alter strategies in one iteration,
SPBLLA’s synchronous learning rate will much larger than
PBLLA. Moreover, in the large-scale UAV network with high
dynamic, PBLLA needs information exchange to decide the
update order, which would severely prolong the learning time.
PBLLA’s learning time might be four times as long as that of
SPBLLA. Thus we can make the conclusion that in the same
condition (the same τ and other indexes), SPBLLA performs
better and is more suitable for large-scale highly dynamic
environment than PBLLA, and SPBLLA can improve the
learning rate several times. With larger altering strategies
probability, SPBLLA will be even more powerful.
However, we have to recognize that the altering strategies
probability ω severely impacts on the efficiency of SPBLLA.
If Theorem 5 limits m to be a large value, the probability will
decrease. When m is too large, UAVs are hard to move, and
the learning rate will decrease. To some points, the learning
rate of SPBLLA will lower than that of PBLLA. In our UAV
ad-hoc network scenario, when τ = 0.01 and m = 0.03,
which is circled in Fig. 14, the probability of altering strategies
ω < 0.01. The probability of altering strategies in SPBLLA is
less than that of PBLLA, and the SPBLLA will spend more
learning time.
Fig. 15 shows τ and m’s impact on the probability of
altering strategies ω = (e
1
τ )m. The red circle in Fig. 15
matches with the red circle in Fig. 14, where SPBLLA
is not efficient. The line ω = (e
1
τ )m = 0.01 marks the
same efficiency of the two algorithms, where SPBLLA alters
one UAV in one iteration on average. When post-disaster
scenarios are in the same degree of dynamic, lower m permits
higher changing strategies probability. If we want to increase
altering probability, we can limit the utility change in each
iteration to reduce m. Nevertheless, such a method reduces the
updated amount which also causes a negative influence on the
learning rate. Then how to balance the altering probability and
update amount is a new topic that needs further investigation.
Besides, how to reduce m in Theorem 5 is another task that
requires further research.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we establish a UAV ad-hoc network in the
large-scale post-disaster area with the aggregative game. We
propose a synchronous learning algorithm (SPBLLA) which
expedites the learning rate comparing to the asynchronous
learning algorithm (PBLLA), and shows desired behavior in
highly dynamic scenarios. The learning rate of SPBLLA can
be 10 times larger than that of PBLLA. Even though there
exists fluctuation during convergence, SNR has been improved
and the network can cover over 95% post-disaster area. From
our analysis, we see that more UAVs provide higher utilities
in the network. Though our proposed algorithm fits a highly
dynamic environment, the learning rate of SPBLLA decreases
when m becomes large. In further work, improved SPBLLA
which supports a wide range of m will be needed.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE THEOREM 2
Proof: Formulate a function φ:
φ(s) =
∑
i∈M
{A E∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
+B[
∑
1≤n≤N
Pin−αD¯i]+C D˜i
D
}. (27)
When UAVi change its strategy from s to s′, its utility
changes
Ui(s
′
i, s−i)− Ui(si, s−i)
=
(
A
E∑
1≤n≤N
P ′in
+B{
∑
[P ′i − γσip(s−i)]⊗ Ci − αD¯′i}+ C
D˜′i
D
)
−
(
A
E∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
+B{
∑
[Pi − γσip(s−i)]⊗ Ci − αD¯i}+ C D˜i
D
)
= A(
E∑
1≤n≤N
P ′in
− E∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
) +B(
∑
(P ′i − Pi)⊗ Ci)
+Bα[(D′i − κ
∑
j 6=i
Dj)− (Di − κ
∑
j 6=i
Dj)] + C(
D˜′i
D
− D˜i
D
)
= A(
E∑
1≤n≤N
P ′in
− E∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
) +B
∑
1≤n≤N
(P ′in − Pin)
+Bα(D′i −Di) + C(
D˜′i
D
− D˜i
D
).
(28)
As for function φ
φ(s′i, s−i)− φ(si, s−i)
=
∑
i∈M
{A E∑
1≤n≤N
P ′in
+B[
∑
1≤n≤N
P ′in − αD¯′i] + C D˜
′
i
D
}
−
∑
i∈M
{A E∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
+B[
∑
1≤n≤N
Pin − αD¯i] + C D˜i
D
}
= A(
E∑
1≤n≤N
P ′in
− E∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
) +B
∑
1≤n≤N
(P ′in − Pin)
+Bα(D′i −Di) + C( D˜
′
i
D
− D˜i
D
).
(29)
Therefore,
Ui(s
′
i, s−i)− Ui(si, s−i) = φ(s′i, s−i)− φ(si, s−i)
and φ is the potential function of UAV ad-hoc network game.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: Define the state that UAV ad-hoc netwok has the
latest two strategy profiles s(t−1) and s(t) to be tuple a(t) =
[s(t− 1), s(t), x(t)], where x(t) = [x1(t), x2(t), ..., xM (t)].
Let  = e−
1
τ . When  approaches to 0+, ω = 0,
then the unperturbed process equals to UAVs never altering
strategies. It is obvious that the recurrent classes of UAV
ad-hoc network game with unperturbed process are [s, s, 0],
where two strategy profiles are identical and any element in
x(t) is 0. Any transition in the process of SPBLLA can be
written as
z1 = [s0, s1, x1]→ z2[s1, s2, x2],
to be specific
x1i = 0⇒
{
x2i = 0, s
2
i = s
1
i , or
x2i = 1, s
2
i ∈ Ci(s1i ),
x1i = 1⇒ x2i = 0, s2i ∈ s0i , s1i .
The probability of transition from a1 to a2 is
Pa1→a2 =
( ∏
i:x1i=0,x
2
i=0
(1− ω)
)( ∏
i:x1i=0,x
2
i=1
ω
|Ci(s1i )|
)
( ∏
i:xii=1,s
2
i=s
0
i
−Ui(s
0)
−Ui(s0) + −Ui(s1)
)
( ∏
i:xii=1,s
2
i=s
1
i
−Ui(s
1)
−Ui(s0) + −Ui(s1)
)
.
(30)
Denote
Vi(s
0, s1) := max{Ui(s0), Ui(s1)}, (31)
s(x) :=
∑
i
xi. (32)
Multiplying the numerator and denominator of Pz1→z2 by∏
i∈M 
Vi(s
0,s1), and
let
R(a1 → a2) = ms(x2)+∑
i:xii=1,s
2
i=s
0
i
(Vi(s
0, s1)− Ui(s0))+
∑
i:xii=1,s
2
i=s
1
i
(Vi(s
0, s1)− Ui(s1)).
Pa1→a2
R(z1→z2)
=
( ∏
i:x1i=0,x
2
i=0
(1− m)
)( ∏
i:x1i=0,x
2
i=1
1
|Ci(s1i )|
)
( ∏
i:xii=1,s
2
i=s
0
i
1
Vi(s0,s1)−Ui(s0) + Vi(s0,s1)−Ui(s1)
)
( ∏
i:xii=1,s
2
i=s
1
i
1
Vi(s0,s1)−Ui(s0) + Vi(s0,s1)−Ui(s1)
)
.
(33)
Since when → 0+,
Vi(s
0,s1)−Ui(s0) + Vi(s
0,s1)−Ui(s1) → 1.
Thus, 0 < lim→0
Pz1→z2
R(z1→z2)
< ∞ and R(z1 → z2) is the
resistance of transition from a1 to a2. Then SPBLLA induces
a regular perturbed markov process.
According to Lemma 1 in [39], we learn that the stochas-
tically stable strategy profiles are strategy profiles with mini-
mum stochastic potential, and a strategy profile is a stochasti-
cally stable strategy profile only if it is in a recurrent class of
unperturbed process P 0. Then we only need to prove that the
root of minimum trees of strategy profiles S is the maximizer
of φ. Denote 3 kinds of strategy profile X , Y and Z ,where X
is what cannot be written as [s, s, 0], Y = [s, s, 0] is what is
not a maximizer of φ, and Z = [s, s, 0] is what is a maximizer
of φ. Only Y and Z are the candidates for stochastically stable
strategy profiles.
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Fig. 16: Tree T is a tree that has an edge s → s˜, where multiple UAVs atler strategies. We give a method of transformation
from T to T ′, which removes s → s˜: add orange edges of L (edges s → s1, s1 → s2, and s2 → s˜) to the tree T and then
remove blue edges of LR (edges s1 → s5, s2 → s3, and s→ s˜) from the tree T.
Due to X cannot be the stochastically stable strategy
profile, we focus on Y and Z. Build a minimum resistance
tree T rooted at s∗, and some edges have multiple UAVs
alter strategies. At each edge, there are several UAVs such
that ski 6= sk−1i , which compose a group G ⊆ M . Then the
probability of transition from s to s′ is
Ps→s′ =
∑
S⊆M :G⊆S
m|S|(1−m)|M\S|
∏
i∈M
−Ui(s
′)
−Ui(s′) + −Ui(s)
,
the resistance of transition from s to s′ is
R(s→ s′) = m|G|+
∑
i∈G
(Vi(s, s
′)− Ui(s′)). (34)
Denote the upper bound of Vi(s, s′)−Ui(s′) for any i ∈M
to be ∆, the resistance of the transition from s to s′ satisfies
the inequality as follows:
m|G|+ ∆|G| ≥ R(s→ s′) ≥ m|G|. (35)
In the first condition, there is merely a single UAV altering
strategy for each edge [s→ s˜] ∈ T , then the argument in [38]
illustrates that s∗ is a maximizer of the potential function.
In another condition, assuming that there exists an edge
[s → s˜] ∈ T with multiple UAVs atlering strategies, Let G˜
consist of the group of these multiple UAVs. The resistance
of this edge meets
R(s→ s˜) ≥ m|G˜|. (36)
Consider a path L = {s = s0 → s1 → ... → s G˜|}, where
for any k ∈ 1, ..., |G˜|, there is only one UAV altering strategy
and the rest UAVs keep the original strategies. equ. (35) shows
that the resistance of these edges is less than
R(sk−1 → sk) ≤ m+ ∆, (37)
and the resistance of L is at most
R(L) ≤ |G˜|(m+ ∆). (38)
Build a new tree T ′ rooted at s∗ as well but remove
redundant edges of LR from T and add edges of L to T . The
redundant edges consist of [s → s˜] and other directed edges
rooted at strategy profiles in {s1, s2, ...s|G˜|−1} but not in L.
Fig. 16 presents how the new tree T ′ forms. We can deduce
from equ. (36) that R(s → s˜) ≥ m|G˜| and the remanding
edges in LR is at least m. Then, the resistance of LR satisfies
R(PR) ≥ m|G˜|+m(|G˜| − 1). (39)
The resistance of tree T ′ is
R(T ′) = R(T ) +R(L)−R(PR)
≤ R(T ) + |G˜|(m+ ∆)− (m|G˜|+m(|G˜| − 1))
= R(T ) + ∆|G˜| −m(|G˜| − 1).
(40)
Since |G˜| ≥ 2, if m > 2∆ then R(T ′) < R(T ). The conflict
implies that trees with edges, which has multiple UAVs
changing strategies, are not the minimum resistance trees and
this condition do not exist. Therefore, only maximizers of
potential function are stochastically stable.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof: Notice that ∆max = |Ui(s′) − Ui(s)|max, where
the distinction between s′ and s is capable to be made in one
iteration. Define δ(x) as the discrepancy of x in an iteration.
In one iteration
Ui(s
′)− Ui(s)
=
(
A
E∑
1≤n≤N
P ′in
+B{
∑
[(P ′i − γσip(s−i))⊗ Ci]− αD¯′i}
+ C
D˜′i
D
)
−
(
A
E∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
+B{
∑
[(Pi − γσip(s−i))⊗ Ci]
− αD¯i}+ C D˜i
D
)
(41)
=δ(
AE∑
1≤n≤N
Pin
+B
∑
1≤n≤N
Pin) + δ(Bγ
∑
σip(s−i))
+ δ(−BαDi) + δ(Bακ
∑
σia) + δ(C
D˜i
D
).
(42)
If each δ(x) approaches maximum, Ui(s′)−Ui(s) gets the
maximum. The maximum δ(x) are as follows.
δ(
AE∑
1≤n≤N
P ′in
+B
∑
1≤n≤N
P ′in)max
=AE(
1∑
Ci · P1 −
1∑
Ci(P1 + ∆P )
) +B
∑
Ci ·∆P
=AE
∆P∑
Ci · P1 · (P1 + ∆P ) +B
∑
Ci ·∆P,
(43)
δ(Bγ
∑
σip(s−i))max = Bγ∆P ·
∑
(
∑
j 6=i
Cj ⊗ Ci), (44)
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δ(−BαDi)max =Bαpitan2θ[h2nh − (hnh −∆h)2]
=Bαpitan2θ(2hnh∆h−∆h2),
(45)
δ(Bακ
∑
σia)max = Bακ(M−1)pitan2θ(2hnh∆h−∆h2),
(46)
δ(C
D˜i
D
)max =
C
D
pitan2θ[h2βnh − (hnh −∆h)2β ]. (47)
Thus, ∆max equals to the summation of the right value of
Eqs. (43)–(47). When m > ∆max, m satisfies the assumption
that m is large enough.
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